The Need for the United States of America's Amphibious Capability in an Era of Maritime Focus: Analysis of the British Execution of the 1982 Recapture

Name: The Need for the United States of America's Amphibious Capability in an Era of Maritime Focus: Analysis of the British Execution of the 1982 Recapture
Brand: Progressive Management
SKU: 1710546

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1739175The Need for the United States of America's Amphibious Capability in an Era of Maritime Focus: Analysis of the British Execution of the 1982 Recapturehttps://www.gandhi.com.mx/the-need-for-the-united-states-of-america-s-amphibious-capability-in-an-era-of-maritime-focus-analysis-of-the-british-execution-of-the-1982-recapture-of-the-falkland-islands-operation-corporate-1/phttps://gandhi.vtexassets.com/arquivos/ids/311168/234a3bcd-737c-4619-9f15-ae7805f18e5d.jpg?v=638334200164870000173173MXNProgressive ManagementInStock/Ebooks/This report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Comparing events in Operation CORPORATE as a cautionary tale for the United States current strategic, economic, and military conditions will demonstrate the United States is on a course similar to the United Kingdom, and could face similar hardships and potentially adverse results should there be a military challenge to the United States in the western Pacific or another maritime region.The British execution of the recapture of the Falkland islands in 1982, Operation CORPORATE, illustrates the difficulties a maritime nation may face conducting long range expeditionary military operations with a force ill prepared for such measures. Decades of significant military cuts in their naval, air, and expeditionary land forces, coupled with a strategy focused on the land defense of Europe against the Soviet threat, left the British military woefully unprepared for the degree of immediate expeditionary operations required to accomplish national aims. Shortfalls in amphibious shipping, the lack of a properly trained and equipped landing force of the size required, lack of joint doctrine, aviation shortfalls, and a strained support/logistics establishment set the conditions for an operation that had no guarantee for success, despite British national prestige being in the balance. Only through the resourceful actions of the military, the unity of national cause due to the nature of the crisis, and the professionalism of the military was the operation a success. It encountered numerous areas of friction and potential failure, any of which the Argentine forces could have exploited with decisive results. Had the campaign lasted even just weeks longer, the South Atlantic weather would have placed the British expeditionary force in jeopardy of logistic isolation. The Argentine forces experienced their share of adversity in the campaign, tipping the balance ever so slightly towards the British. This U.S. is unlikely to enjoy this circumstance in the western Pacific if challenged by a major regional competitor. The British success is underscored by numerous lessons learned that are appropriate for consideration by contemporary United States military planners as the U.S. accepts reductions in current amphibious capability in an era of the nationally declared shift of focus to the Pacific region.U.S. must maintain an amphibious force as it expresses strategic int1710546The Need for the United States of America's Amphibious Capability in an Era of Maritime Focus: Analysis of the British Execution of the 1982 Recapture173173https://www.gandhi.com.mx/the-need-for-the-united-states-of-america-s-amphibious-capability-in-an-era-of-maritime-focus-analysis-of-the-british-execution-of-the-1982-recapture-of-the-falkland-islands-operation-corporate-1/phttps://gandhi.vtexassets.com/arquivos/ids/311168/234a3bcd-737c-4619-9f15-ae7805f18e5d.jpg?v=638334200164870000InStockMXN99999DIEbook20189780463804834_W3siaWQiOiI0ZGQ1YWQyYS04YjIwLTQ2YjUtYmI5Yi01NTljNjQ3Y2UwOGIiLCJsaXN0UHJpY2UiOjE3MywiZGlzY291bnQiOjAsInNlbGxpbmdQcmljZSI6MTczLCJpbmNsdWRlc1RheCI6dHJ1ZSwicHJpY2VUeXBlIjoiSXBwIiwiY3VycmVuY3kiOiJNWE4iLCJmcm9tIjoiMjAyNC0wNS0xOVQyMzowMDowMFoiLCJyZWdpb24iOiJNWCIsImlzUHJlb3JkZXIiOmZhbHNlfV0=9780463804834_This report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. Comparing events in Operation CORPORATE as a cautionary tale for the United States current strategic, economic, and military conditions will demonstrate the United States is on a course similar to the United Kingdom, and could face similar hardships and potentially adverse results should there be a military challenge to the United States in the western Pacific or another maritime region.The British execution of the recapture of the Falkland islands in 1982, Operation CORPORATE, illustrates the difficulties a maritime nation may face conducting long range expeditionary military operations with a force ill prepared for such measures. Decades of significant military cuts in their naval, air, and expeditionary land forces, coupled with a strategy focused on the land defense of Europe against the Soviet threat, left the British military woefully unprepared for the degree of immediate expeditionary operations required to accomplish national aims. Shortfalls in amphibious shipping, the lack of a properly trained and equipped landing force of the size required, lack of joint doctrine, aviation shortfalls, and a strained support/logistics establishment set the conditions for an operation that had no guarantee for success, despite British national prestige being in the balance. Only through the resourceful actions of the military, the unity of national cause due to the nature of the crisis, and the professionalism of the military was the operation a success. It encountered numerous areas of friction and potential failure, any of which the Argentine forces could have exploited with decisive results. Had the campaign lasted even just weeks longer, the South Atlantic weather would have placed the British expeditionary force in jeopardy of logistic isolation. The Argentine forces experienced their share of adversity in the campaign, tipping the balance ever so slightly towards the British. This U.S. is unlikely to enjoy this circumstance in the western Pacific if challenged by a major regional competitor. The British success is underscored by numerous lessons learned that are appropriate for consideration by contemporary United States military planners as the U.S. accepts reductions in current amphibious capability in an era of the nationally declared shift of focus to the Pacific region.U.S. must maintain an amphibious force as it expresses strategic interest in the maritime region of the western Pacific. The operational environment in the western Pacific is the ideal operational domain for an amphibious force. Ensuring the U.S. maintains this capability to not only project force with immediacy in time of crisis, but also maintain and provide for that force should be an apolitical priority for the nation to ensure the U.S. can protect its interests, support international trade and growth, and maintain stability in distant strategic regions of potential turmoil....9780463804834_Progressive Managementlibro_electonico_a26a548b-4621-3ea7-955d-a178d0d8145b_9780463804834;9780463804834_9780463804834Progressive ManagementInglésMéxicohttps://getbook.kobo.com/koboid-prod-public/smashwords-epub-dfd5c1f9-332b-4b45-b89b-41a4ed43ce3f.epub2018-08-20T00:00:00+00:00Progressive Management